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III Abstract 
This report analyses the use of legitimacy strategies by the platinum mining 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) post the Marikana 
incident. Content analysis is employed to study the CSR disclosures in the integrated 
reports of the companies from 2011 to 2013, using pre-determined content themes 
and integrated report sections. The results provide evidence in support of the 
legitimacy theory, as the quantity of CSR disclosures mainly focused on social 
related issues generally increases in the sector during the period under review. 
Although some companies do not increase their disclosure, their response is still in 
line with the predictions of legitimacy theory which envisages a change in the 
reporting pattern, not necessarily always an increase in disclosure. The study also 
analyses the reports for specific legitimacy strategies in action, and examples of 
these are provided and scrutinised. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1: Purpose and context of the study 
South Africa is one of the top global mineral producers with the result that the mining 
industry  provides a significant portion of the country’s employment opportunities and 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employing approximately 460 000 employees and 
an additional 400 000 employed by the industry’s suppliers (de Villiers & Alexander, 
2014). Although there are significant economic benefits from mining, these are often 
accompanied by adverse environmental and social effects which include depletion of 
non-renewable resources, land use, as well as health and safety concerns 
(Azapagic, 2004). Mining operations can also go hand-in-hand with a number of 
social challenges, as highlighted by unprecedented strike action in the sector during 
2012 (Chinguno, 2013). 
In particular, 16 August 2012 saw the killing of thirty-four mine workers and the injury 
of seventy-eight others in a strike at the Lonmin Plc’s (Lonmin) platinum mine in 
Marikana (Nkosi, 2012). This was the most violent demonstration witnessed after 
Apartheid  (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). International and local media gave the event 
significant attention, while the investor community was uncertain about the 
implications of the industrial action, not just for Lonmin, but for the South African 
mining industry as a whole (Cavvadas & Mitchell, 2012). The concern was justified by 
the fact that, although Marikana was the most violent, it certainly was not the only 
strike action in the platinum mining sector that year, being  preceded by the Impala 
Platinum strike in January 2012 (Chinguno, 2013). This incident which had some of 
its roots in the failure of Lonmin to resolve labour disputes left the local and 
international community disturbed (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). Although the mining 
houses were contributing economically to the social wellbeing of the surrounding 
communities as reported in their integrated reports, their social licence was at stake 
because of the societal disapproval stemming from the widespread protests that 
struck the industry in 2012 (cf. Patten, 1992). In order to avoid public policy 
intervention which could have been the expected result of the societal pressures 
(Patten, 1992), there was need for the mining houses, particularly Lonmin, to regain 
legitimacy so as to continue sustainably. 
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In this context, this study aims to investigate how mining companies use CSR 
disclosures in their integrated reports to preserve credibility in the eyes of 
constituents after widespread strike action posed threats to organisational legitimacy. 
The research extends on a prior body of interpretive corporate governance research  
(Denis, 2001; Solomon & Maroun, 2012), using inductive thematic analysis to identify 
trends in CSR disclosures in the integrated reports of  platinum mining houses in 
South Africa and to reveal possible strategies for maintaining or repairing corporate 
legitimacy (see Suchman, 1995) in the aftermath of strike action at Marikana.  
1.2 Research question 
Is there evidence of strategies to use CSR disclosures in integrated reports to repair 
or maintain organisational legitimacy of the South African platinum mining houses 
after the Marikana incident? 
1.3 Significance of the study 
There have been mixed results relating to the value relevance of CSR disclosures 
across the globe (de Klerk & de Villiers, 2012; Hassel, Nilsson, & Nyquist, 2005; 
Schadewitz & Niskala, 2010). Some have shown a correlation between CSR 
disclosures and share price movements, as well as company cost of capital 
(Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014), while others have reported insignificant 
relationships between the level of CSR disclosure and the value attached to a 
company (Moneva & Ortas, 2008; Murray, Sinclair, Power, & Gray, 2006). 
Nevertheless, there has been a marked increase in the extent of CSR information 
being included in annual or integrated reports (Makiwane & Padia, 2012; Solomon & 
Maroun, 2012), especially following the release of King-III and the discussion papers 
on the framework for integrated reporting (Integrated Reporting Committee of South 
Africa, 2011; International Integrated Reporting Council, 2011 ; 2013).  
A paradox between demand for comprehensive CSR reporting, on the one hand 
(Solomon & Moroun, 2012), and the failure to confirm consistently the value 
relevance of CSR disclosures across all companies (Moneva & Ortas, 2008; Murray 
et al., 2006), on the other, suggests that there may be other reasons for companies 
engaging in CSR disclosure (Solomon, Solomon, Joseph, & Norton, 2013). One of 
the possible explanations is that accounting can be seen as a social construct, 
meaning that it seeks to do more than just communicate financial information  
(Hopwood, 1987). Prior literature has asserted that companies use disclosures, 
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particularly CSR disclosures, more as an image enhancement tool than as a means 
of providing performance information (Patten & Zhao, 2014). This could be a possible 
explanation for companies to strive for impression management through disclosures 
to stakeholders, in order to retain their confidence (Solomon et al., 2013). For 
example, Patten and Zhao (2014) observed that companies focused more on 
disclosing CSR initiatives and programs than on actual CSR performance during the 
period. 
It is for this reason that this study investigates whether CSR disclosures are possibly 
being used to advance a social position in financial reporting in South Africa, looking 
particularly at legitimising business institutions. Similar studies have been performed 
by Patten (1992), Hogner (1982) as well as Guthrie and Parker (1989) but to the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is no South African research on the link between CSR 
disclosure and organisational legitimacy. For this purpose, the Marikana incident has 
been chosen as, similar to the events studied in the above-mentioned examples, it 
attracted negative publicity and left companies exposed to disapproval  and possible 
public policy intervention. The unions demanded a legal inquiry into the matter 
(Nkosi, 2012), pressuring the mining houses to regain legitimacy to avoid adverse 
consequences. 
This study will, therefore, contribute to a pool of existing literature, adding a unique 
South African context and showing that corporate reporting is more than just an 
economic reality. It will also be of interest to corporate governance academics and 
practitioners wanting to understand better the relevance of CSR disclosures in South 
African integrated reports.  
1.4 Limitations and delimitations 
Firstly, the research makes use of integrated reports as the only source of data 
because management have control over this communication medium as opposed to 
data obtained from the press which is often open to journalistic interpretations and 
possible misrepresentations (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). In addition, the integrated 
report is intended to be the primary means of public interaction with stakeholders 
(International Integrated Reporting Council, 2011; Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange, 2013), with the result that the integrated report is expected to provide high 
quality direct insight into the strategies being used by Platinum companies to manage 
corporate legitimacy (cf. Guthrie & Parker, 1989). It is for this reason that the 
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websites and the separate sustainability reports will not be analysed as they are 
expected already to be condensed into the integrated report, as per the King III 
recommendation (Institute of Directors, 2009). 
Secondly, due to the qualitative nature of the research, this report will not determine 
causality (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010) as it will not reach a definitive conclusion on 
whether CSR disclosure is used primarily as a means to  legitimise South African 
mining companies. Instead, the study aims to assess if there is evidence of 
legitimacy strategies in the reports. In addition, the results cannot be generalised to 
the whole population due to the limited sample size. Nevertheless, the interpretive 
style of the study will highlight a number of concepts or principles which are expected 
to be relevant to a broad group of stakeholders (Carels, Maroun, & Padia, 2013). 
Thirdly, evaluating  legitimacy is  a subjective exercise as it is a concept informed by  
multiple dynamic sources in a socially constructed setting (Tilling & Tilt, 2010). This 
means that an element of research bias is an inherent limitation of the study (Tilling & 
Tilt, 2010). In addition, this can present an obstacle for accurate replication of the 
study by different researchers. Nevertheless, by grounding the study in a well-
described theoretical framework, coupled with detailed disclosure of the processes 
used to collect and analyse the data, as well as the findings, this threat to validity and 
reliability is mitigated (Creswell & Clarke, 2007; Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). 
Finally, the study examines only the use of CSR disclosure in the context of the 
Platinum Industry’s possible reaction to the industrial unrest at Marikana. No attempt 
is made to analyse whether the mining industry responded to threats in other areas 
or to other events (cf. Patten, 1992). 
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2 Theoretical framework 
Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework on which the research is grounded. 
Section 2.1 expands on the Legitimacy theory, while 2.2 introduces CSR. Section 2.3 
then links the theory with CSR, and Section 2.4 connects everything to the Marikana 
incident. 
2.1 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimisation involves a process by which an organisation justifies its right of 
existence, either outright or through conformity to the societal norms (Suchman, 
1995). Legitimacy theory rests heavily on perceptions of the relevant, influential 
people, which makes it subjective. It does not depend on individual assessments or 
events but rather is a blanket term of the general perception from society at large, 
based on the history of the organisation (Suchman, 1995).The entity’s actions need 
to be appropriate or generally acceptable if measured according to a system of 
beliefs or values (Suchman, 1995).  
The  theory is based on the social contract that exists between firms and society 
where firms are allowed to continue operations on condition that they offer direct or 
indirect benefit to constituents  (Deegan, 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Naser, Al-
Hussaini, Al-Kwari, & Nuseibeh, 2006). Firms, therefore, seek to convince society 
that their existence brings more good than harm in both economic and social terms 
so as to ensure continuity (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Suchman, 1995). 
2.1.1 Types of legitimacy 
Legitimacy exists in three forms: pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy.  
Pragmatic legitimacy depends on self-interests of the public and can be exchange, 
influence or dispositional in nature (O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011; Suchman, 
1995). Under exchange legitimacy, society supports an organisation’s policy based 
on the expected material benefits to the society (Suchman, 1995). Influence 
legitimacy is attained through being responsive to stakeholders and incorporating 
society’s larger interests in the firm’s decision-making process (Suchman, 1995). 
One effective way of achieving this is through having community representatives at 
the firm, whose main mandate is to ensure that community interests are considered 
when the firm makes policy decisions. Dispositional legitimacy ascribes a personality 
to the organisation and uses that to convince the public that it shares the same 
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values with them (Suchman, 1995). This, however, is not dealt with in the report as 
the focus is on integrated reports. 
Moral legitimacy shies away from the self-interest that underlies pragmatic 
legitimacy. It hinges on whether a certain action is viewed as the right thing to do 
(O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995). Moral legitimacy is made up of four aspects: 
consequential, procedural, personal and structural legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
Consequential legitimacy is result-oriented and is granted to an entity based on its 
visible achievements (Suchman, 1995). With procedural legitimacy the focal point is 
not merely the results. Emphasis is placed on the morality surrounding the means to 
that end (O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995). When the consequences of an 
action are invisible and not easily measurable, procedural legitimacy becomes 
superior to consequential legitimacy (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Structural legitimacy is 
based on the appropriate symbols for the organisation’s identity, while personal 
legitimacy is dependent on the personal aura surrounding the individual leaders of 
the entity (O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995). 
Cognitive legitimacy is the most powerful but most rarely attained form of legitimacy 
(O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Suchman, 1995). It is split into two: comprehensibility and 
being taken for granted (Suchman, 1995). The comprehensibility approach attempts 
to make society understand the organisation through providing logical, 
understandable explanations for its actions and plans, whereas the taken-for-granted 
legitimacy convinces the public that they need the organisation, and make the 
alternative unthinkable (Suchman, 1995). 
2.1.2 Legitimacy strategies 
Suchman (1995) identified three stages of legitimacy, namely, gaining, maintaining 
and repairing legitimacy. Gaining legitimacy involves winning public acceptance for a 
new activity which  an organisation seeks to undertake (O'Donovan, 2002; Suchman, 
1995). Organisations seeking to gain legitimacy may choose to do so in one of three 
main ways: firstly, the organisation may seek to adapt the expectations of the existing 
society. Another option is to sift through several environments and find onlookers that 
support the organisation’s practices. The last strategy is to form new public with new 
beliefs that will be in support of the entity’s actions (Suchman, 1995). 
Due to the fact that legitimacy is a relationship rather than a possession (Suchman, 
1995) , maintaining legitimacy, which is considered simpler than gaining or repairing 
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it (O'Donovan, 2002), is necessary as the business progresses. Unforeseen events, 
innovations and even external shocks occur, which are bound to shake even the 
strongest legitimacy foundation, resulting in the need to constantly reassure society 
that the corporation still deserves to exist (Suchman, 1995). In order to maintain 
legitimacy, the entity can improve its ability to identify public reactions and predict 
upcoming hurdles so as to be better prepared to deal with them and maintain 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). In addition, an organisation may focus on protecting its 
past achievements through stock-piling the good deeds done in the past to keep 
society focused on those while diverting attention from anything that might attract 
negative publicity (Suchman, 1995).  
When a crisis occurs undermining the reputation of an organisation, managers are 
compelled to react and repair damaged legitimacy (O'Donovan, 2002). The Exxon 
Valdez oil spill is an example of one such incident that led to a need to repair 
legitimacy of the industry (O'Donovan, 2002). The first thing companies tend to do is 
normalise operations by separating the adverse event from the rest of the usual 
business (Suchman, 1995). Companies then select one of the four strategies below:  
Table 1:  Strategies for maintaining and repairing legitimacy1  
Strategy Activities involved 
1. Diverting attention  Withhold any negative information 
 Divert attention from the negative incident and rather 
disclose any good CSR work that has been 
accomplished in that period. 
2. Alter stakeholder 
expectations 
 Offer extensive explanations about the event to make 
the society understand the organisation’s 
circumstances and maybe even condone its 
involvement in the adverse incident. 
 Inform the public about risks inherent in the industry to 
gain a level of sympathy.  
 Create an appreciation of the organisation and its 
produce, thus re-igniting a level of cognitive legitimacy 
where the society feels a need of the organisation to 
exist as it brings more benefits than harm and the 
alternative is unimaginable. 
3. Managing blame  Defend the company’s reputation through explaining 
that the company did not breach any rules leading up 
to the adverse event. Question the moral responsibility 
of the organisation, given the circumstances. 
 Protect past accomplishments so that the negative 
event does not demine every good thing that the 
company has accomplished thus far. 
                                                 
1 Adapted from O’Donovan (2002) and Suchman (1995) 
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 Shift the blame to individuals and distance the 
company from the incident. 
4. Adhering 
 to society’s values 
 Creation of new policies and values to prevent 
recurrence of the negative incident 
 Selective confession of what was wrong with the 
system, leading to strategic restructuring through one 
of the following: 
 Create “monitors and watchdogs” that will investigate 
the root causes of the incident and ensure that nothing 
similar happens in future, or, 
 Replacement of senior executives to signify change 
going forward. 
 
During the legitimacy process, the company acts as though it is human, attempting to 
fit into the norms and values of the society in which it operates.  Usually this is 
achieved by  actively engaging in and reporting on CSR initiatives and, with 
legitimacy being dependent on communication (Elsbach, 1994), analysis of the CSR 
information becomes relevant to assessing whether companies are using the 
disclosures as a legitimacy tool. 
2.2 Corporate social responsibility reporting in South Africa 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is not consistently defined in past literature as 
different individuals have varying opinions and interpretations of the term (Kansal, 
Joshi, & Batra, 2014; Patten & Zhao, 2014). For the purpose of this study, CSR  can 
be summarised as the entity’s actions and policies which  display a level of concern 
for the wellbeing of society as a whole (Roberts, 1992). The social responsibility 
activities include policies encouraging affirmative action, equal employment 
opportunities, community involvement and producing safe, environmentally friendly 
goods (Roberts, 1992).  
Over time, there has been a growing interest in  companies’ ability to create and 
sustain value in the short-, medium- and long-term (International Integrated 
Reporting Council, 2011). The emphasis is on organisations striving to meet the 
needs of the present generation without disadvantaging future generations (Steurer, 
Langer, Konrad, & Martinuzzi, 2005). Society has evolved from seeing organisations 
as mere profit generators to expecting them to be responsible, corporate citizens 
(Institute of Directors, 2009). This has, in turn, attached some level of moral 
responsibility to organisations (Institute of Directors, 2009; International Integrated 
Reporting Council, 2011; Solomon, 2010). 
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CSR reporting has been swiftly increasing since the 1992 Earth Summit, which 
compelled businesses to be socially responsible and act in a sustainable way (Mutti, 
Yakovleva, Vazquez-Brust, & Di Marco, 2012). The issuing of the King-II Report of 
Corporate Governance in 2002 attracted worldwide attention to the issue of corporate 
governance, as Directors were compelled to consider the impact of the corporate 
decisions on the surrounding communities and environment (Institute of Directors, 
2009).  (This is especially relevant in the  mining industry because it is regarded as 
one of the most environmentally and socially disruptive industries (Jenkins & 
Yakovleva, 2006)).  
The mining industry is one of those most targeted by pressure groups, media critics 
and environmentalists due to the adverse social and environmental effects with which 
it is associated (de Villiers & Alexander, 2014). Among these are land degradation, 
worker health and safety issues, as well as pollution, which have left the industry as 
one of the least favourites in a world that is consistently praising environmental 
awareness and upholding human rights (de Villiers & Alexander, 2014). To ensure 
their continued existence, mining houses are under enormous pressure to ensure the 
benefits they provide to society are seen to be more than the costs associated. 
Communication is one of the most powerful pillars of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). In 
order to prove that they have been socially responsible, companies use disclosures 
in their annual and integrated reports to communicate the information to the 
stakeholders (Patten & Zhao, 2014). For South African companies in particular, CSR 
disclosure in integrated reports is informed heavily by the recommendations of King-
III (2009). The GRI’s framework and the guidance provided on integrated reporting by 
the International Integrated Reporting Council (2011) and Integrated Reporting 
Committee of South Africa (2011) are also popular reference points for integrated 
reporting (Carels et al., 2013; Makiwane & Padia, 2012).  
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), South Africa’s main stock exchange, 
formed the Sustainable Reporting Index (SRI) in 2004 in order to give investors an 
opportunity to invest in sustainable companies (Institute of Directors, 2009). 
Subsequently, South Africa became the first country that attempted to enforce 
integrated reporting nationally by making King III compliance a listing requirement on 
10 
 
 
 
the JSE from 20102 (Johannesburg Securities Exchange, 2013; Solomon & Moroun, 
2012). Integrated reporting involves communicating the organisation’s plan, 
governance, performance (social, economic and environmental) and forecasts to the 
relevant stakeholders in a manner that correctly provides the holistic context of the 
business operations (IIRC, 2011). Although reporting on CSR reporting is expected 
to make companies think and behave responsibly (Intergrated Reporting Committe of 
South Africa, 2011), corporates have often been accused of using it more as an 
image-enhancer than an informative and transformation device (Patten & Zhao, 
2014). 
2.3 Link between CSR and legitimacy theory 
Historically, companies were considered legitimate if they achieved a reasonable 
financial return relative to the level of invested capital  (Patten, 1992). Society, 
however, started to note the negative social and environmental effects that 
accompany economic growth (Tinker & Niemark, 1987), and  began to consider  
social responsibility when according  legitimacy to otherwise profitable organisations 
(Patten, 1992). A  problem  with this new legitimisation system, which still exists 
today, is that the measure of social responsibility is not as clear-cut as profit 
measurement (Patten, 1992). Instead, public policy  became the driving force behind 
social responsibility as laws were enacted in response to public outcry, which then 
served to govern the social impact of businesses (Deegan, 2002; Patten, 1992).   
Although there is a business case for providing extensive CSR disclosures in 
corporate reports, which suggests that CSR disclosures are a possible driver of firm 
value (de Klerk & de Villiers, 2012; International Integrated Reporting Council, 2013), 
researchers have argued that companies are motivated to manage and report on 
their CSR activities by a number of factors. Roberts (1992) argues that firms disclose 
CSR information to avoid government intervention in the running of their businesses 
through regulations which may have negative impact on firms value (Roberts, 1992). 
In other words, CSR reporting  is seen as a strategic move by management to satisfy 
government requirements (Roberts, 1992). Similarly, Solomon et al (2013) suggest 
that, with CSR becoming a generally accepted ‘factor’ for evaluating contemporary 
organisations, much of the effort at providing additional information on CSR initiatives 
                                                 
2 The JSE does not specifically mandate the preparation of an integrated report. It does, however, 
require a company to comply with King-III (which recommends that companies prepare integrated 
reports) or state clearly the reasons for not doing so. This can be interpreted as a de facto mandatory 
requirement to prepare an integrated report.  
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can be attributed to impression management. From a less critical perspective, the 
International Integrated Reporting Council, Integrated Reporting Committee of South 
Africa and Institute of Directors argue that sustainability goes hand-in-hand with 
financial performance to provide a complete measure of corporate success. For 
companies to signal to stakeholders that they are capable of producing and 
sustaining value in the short-, medium- and long-run, it is essential for financial 
information to be complemented by non-financial metrics (Institute of Directors, 2011; 
Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa, 2011; International Integrated 
Reporting Council, 2013). What these varied interpretations also highlight is the 
relevance of legitimacy for explaining the proliferation of CSR disclosures.  
Legitimacy theory has become one of the most popular theories used to explain 
social and environmental disclosures (Campbell, Craven, & Shrives, 2003; Guthrie & 
Parker, 1989; O'Donovan, 2002). Voluntarily disclosing the social responsibilities met 
by the firm helps in achieving the legitimacy goal as it demonstrates to society that 
the firm is not just an economic entity but is also a good corporate citizen (Guthrie & 
Parker, 1989; Naser et al., 2006).  This is complemented by conformance with the 
generally accepted position that long-term sustainability is interconnected with 
effective CSR (Institute of Directors, 2009; Integrated Reporting Committee of South 
Africa, 2011). By providing comprehensive information on CSR initiatives in annual 
reports, organisations are able to demonstrate that they add value for stakeholders in 
a socially responsible fashion (Solomon, 2010), which enhances their pragmatic and 
procedural legitimacy (cf. Suchman, 1995).   
Societal norms should also not be overlooked. With non-financial reporting being 
codified in, inter alia, King-III (Institute of Directors, 2009), the framework on 
integrated reporting (International Integrated Reporting Council, 2011) and the G4 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013), ensuring 
compliance with these codes is important for contemporary firms. The strategy  
legitimises the firm’s actions and ensures that the firm’s existence continues into the 
foreseeable future (Naser et al., 2006) by ‘meshing’ the information in annual or 
integrated reports with the belief sets of constituents which places a high value on 
non-financial reporting (cf. Suchman, 1995). In this way, CSR reporting can be seen 
as a powerful means of  managing public  perceptions (Patten, 1992) and either 
securing, maintaining or repairing damaged legitimacy (cf. Suchman, 1995). 
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O'Donovan (2002), for example, conducted interviews in Australia with managers in 
three industries assumed to have a great negative environmental impact, these being 
the mining, chemical and paper and pulp industries. The research showed that 
managers do use legitimacy strategies in the annual reports and tailor them to the 
situation at hand (O'Donovan, 2002). This is because CSR disclosures are seen as a 
means to image-enhancement, assisting managers to align their values with those of 
society through communication, giving them a chance to lead debates and secure 
societal approval (O'Donovan, 2002). 
Similarly, Patten (1992) established a relationship between legitimacy theory and 
social disclosures through comparison of the Exxon annual report before and after 
the Alaskan oil spill. The research showed a significant increase in disclosure after 
the accident. This is consistent  with the strategies of repairing legitimacy noted by 
Suchman (1995) (Section 2.1), as the increase in disclosures shows that the 
companies were attempting to explain to stakeholders in greater detail about the 
incident, and so regaining the favour of the interested public. This was not limited to 
the company directly involved in the oil spill. The majority of companies in the  
petroleum sector increased their social and environmental disclosures considerably, 
probably due to the perceived need to maintain  legitimacy (Patten, 1992). This 
attests to the point made by Suchman (1995) that companies need consistently to 
maintain their legitimacy due to external shocks that may occur, the Marikana 
incident being one of those shocks. 
Evidence from a study of the Australian company, Broken Hill Proprietary Company 
Limited’s (BHP) annual reports showed inconsistencies between the legitimacy 
theory and the company’s CSR disclosures (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). The 
researchers compared the disclosures before and after specific adverse events, and 
found insignificant differences which rebutted the link between CSR and 
organisational legitimacy (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). Subsequently, however, the 
results of this study were disputed with Deegan et al (2002), showing that BHP did 
respond to negative media coverage through increased voluntary social disclosures 
(Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002). 
Adding an African context to the body of research, de Villiers and van Staden (2006) 
investigated the environmental disclosures of 140 South African companies over a 9-
year period. Their findings indicated that disclosures do initially increase at a time of 
legitimacy crisis but subsequently decrease. This is not seen to be contradictory to 
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the legitimacy theory, but rather consistent with it as organisations increase 
disclosures to address an issue, and once it is resolved, they return to their normal 
disclosures so as to avoid drawing unnecessary attention to past negative incidents 
(de Villiers & van Staden, 2006). 
Prior research shows that legitimacy is important but such research was mainly 
conducted in European countries. This study aims to provide a unique South African 
angle by exploring the integrated reports of the mining houses and analysing their 
reaction to the Marikana incident.  
2.4 South Africa, Marikana and CSR disclosure as an instrument of 
legitimisation 
In 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) came into power. This threatened the 
success of the mine owners as the ANC was against capitalism and strongly linked it 
with social injustices of the Apartheid Era (de Villiers & van Staden, 2006). The ANC 
appeared to be in favour of  nationalisation of the monopolistic, large industries such 
as banks and mines (Bond & Mottiar, 2013; de Villiers & van Staden, 2006), which 
was a source of concern for investors in these industries .  
Such concerns disappeared a few years after independence, but mining companies 
were still under pressure to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and this was 
achieved mainly through social disclosures relevant to the contentious issues at each 
specific period (de Villiers & van Staden, 2006). Any instances of poor CSR practices 
could strengthen the nationalisation debate. This need to gain and maintain 
legitimacy was not limited to the mining industry but was pervasive to the whole 
country as  Apartheid resulted in the political and economic isolation of South Africa  
(Maroun, Coldwell, & Segal, 2014). It is for this reason that South Africa was 
innovative in terms of corporate governance, so as to assure the world that it was 
now a steady, democratic economy worth investing in (Maroun et al., 2014). The 
mining industry makes up a significant portion of the GDP (de Villiers & Alexander, 
2014), thus showing the importance of investor confidence in the sector. 
South Africa has more than 80% of the world’s platinum reserves which shows the 
global significance of the sector (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). During the 2002-2008 
period, the platinum price increased by 350%, leaving the platinum houses 
significantly well-off yet the wealth did not seem to be shared with the general  
workforce who were surviving on a monthly take-home pay of roughly $511 and a 
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housing allowance of $204 (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). Safety and housing were other 
major issues that angered the workforce, leading to the wildcat strikes across the 
industry in 2012, as the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) seemed to have lost 
its loyalties to the workers it purported to represent and was now in favour of the 
mining houses (Alexander, 2013; Bond & Mottiar, 2013; Chinguno, 2013). These 
workers were rapidly joining the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(AMCU), a new union pioneered by former NUM members (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). 
Tumult in the sector began in January 2012 when the Impala platinum mine workers 
went on an unprotected strike demanding a 200% hike in wages (Chinguno, 2013). 
This uproar had its roots in the grievances that had characterised the miners’ lives, 
for example, workers were unhappy about their living conditions, safety, working 
hours, dusty air, high levels of infectious diseases such as TB, as well as racist 
managers (Alexander, 2013). Most of the mine workers were migrant workers, which 
forced them to live in informal settlements close to the mines because they could not 
afford decent accommodation (Alexander, 2013). Soon this was transformed into a 
racial issue, opening the wounds of the Apartheid era as it appeared that the 
grievances were of a similar nature, and the disadvantaged race was the same 
(Chinguno, 2013). This led to the unemployed members of the mining communities 
identifying with the troubles faced by the miners and ready to give them unwavering 
support in their plight (Chinguno, 2013). Workers who were initially against the strike 
were gradually drawn to it through various methods including persuasion and 
coercion (Chinguno, 2013).  
The outcome of the strike motivated other miners to follow the same process. Lonmin 
workers then decided to embark on a similar strike, which was in the pipeline from 
June 2012 (Chinguno, 2013). In the few days leading up to the day of the unfortunate 
incident, 10 people had died in the protests. On the 16 August 2012, 34 Lonmin 
miners were shot dead and 78 others injured by the police in an attempt to stop 
violent protests by the miners (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). This is referred to as the 
Marikana incident. To many, this triggered apartheid memories as the violent 
shootings were likened to the Sharpeville and Soweto incidents3 (Nkosi, 2012), thus 
attracting negative reactions from the society and international communities. 
                                                 
3 During the Sharpeville incident, 69 people were shot dead for burning their passbooks that had been 
implemented by the apartheid regime. The Soweto uprising saw more than 1000 students killed by 
police and the army for protesting against learning Afrikaans in schools (Bond & Mottiar, 2013). 
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The Marikana incident has been described by one of the survivors as having its roots 
in employees asking their employer to pay them a decent wage for their labour 
underground (Nkosi, 2012). Although Lonmin may have attempted to shift 
responsibility for the strike violence to the trade unions contesting for membership, 
the violence could potentially have been avoided had Lonmin agreed to engage with 
its workers (Alexander, 2013). The circumstances surrounding the Lonmin strike 
seem to have fuelled several other violent wildcat strikes, not only in the mining 
industry (AngloGold Ashanti, Goldfield KDC East mines, Kumba Iron Ore, Amplat,), 
but countrywide, encompassing farming and motor industries (Alexander, 2013). With 
such negative perceptions and publicity, it is understandable that the company in 
question, and those in the sector, would need to regain the favour of the investor 
public and the international community so as to avoid public policy intervention, 
hence the expectation of attempts to regain legitimacy for the mining houses post the 
terrible incident (consider Patten, 1992; O’Donovan, 2002). With the integrated report 
being the primary platform of communication with stakeholders in South Africa (see 
International Integrated Reporting Council, 2011; Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange, 2013), it is expected that if any legitimisation strategies were used, they 
should be present in these reports (cf. O'Donovan, 2002).  
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3 Research method 
Section 3 discusses how the researcher addressed the research question. A brief 
introduction which classifies the method is found in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 then 
explains the selected research method, while Section 3.3 justifies the sample 
selection and size. Section 3.4 then explains the data collection and analysis.  
3.1 Research paradigm 
Research methods fall into two broad categories of qualitative and quantitative 
research. Quantitative research, normally referred to as positivist research, makes 
use of quantitative means to observe data and report on findings, while minimising 
researcher interference with the process (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010; Maroun, 2012). 
The number-based approach allows for accurate replication as very little room is left 
for differing interpretations (Creswell, 2003; Maroun, 2012). It has, however, been 
criticised for being divorced from daily business approaches as its focus is more on 
reliability and objectivity (Creswell, 2003) than on relevance (Maroun, 2012), and this 
approach is not used in this study. 
This research adopts a social constructivist (qualitative) perspective on corporate 
reporting, using an interpretive text analysis to explore the legitimising potential of 
CSR disclosures (Merkel-Davis, Brennan, & Vourvachis, 2011). This is different from 
a traditional positivist approach in several ways.  
Interpretive text analysis is a qualitative method. It relies on the researcher’s analysis 
of text to draw inferences from the source material according to a particular 
theoretical framework.  This makes the study far more subjective than the positivist 
scientific approach which, while more mathematically elegant (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2010; Maroun, 2012; Merkel-Davis et al., 2011) overlooks the socially constructed 
nature of corporate reporting (Hopwood, 1987).  
Interpretive text analysis permits the researcher to discuss important themes, 
concepts, assumptions and beliefs, providing an exploratory approach for 
investigating this little studied aspect of corporate (and integrated) reporting (Wodak 
& Meyer, 2009). Validity and reliability are ensured, not by following a scientific 
method (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010) but by documenting the findings in sufficient detail 
to highlight conceptual links between the material under review and a relevant 
theoretical paradigm (Creswell & Clarke, 2007; Maroun, 2012).  
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3.2 Methodology 
This study uses inductive thematic analysis, complemented to a lesser extent by 
discourse analysis. The former falls under the broad category of content analysis 
(Merkel-Davis et al., 2011). Inductive thematic analysis is a common qualitative 
inquiry method for analysing material which involves identifying themes in textual 
data, coding and interpreting the themes (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013). Thematic 
content analysis is frequently used in conjunction with  discourse analysis to  
highlight ‘naturally occurring language’ with the aim of understanding social and 
cultural meanings embedded in  text (Guest et al., 2013, p. 14). 
In thematic analysis, the researcher is the measurement instrument, which 
contributes to its subjectivity, but also to the richness of the analysis and the unique 
insights in answering the research question (Merkel-Davis et al., 2011).  
3.3 Sample4  
The JSE-listed platinum mining companies were purposefully selected for the study. 
The selective sampling is justified by the fact that the platinum mining companies 
were closely linked with the Marikana incident (Chinguno, 2013), as most of the them 
also faced labour unrest during the same period. If any response was present, it is 
expected to be readily identifiable from the selected companies. The integrated 
reports for the 2011-2013 financial years will be analysed for each company, 
providing a reference point for a year before and after the strike action. This 
approach is similar to the one used by Patten (1992). 
Twelve companies are currently listed on the JSE Platinum and Precious metals 
mining sector. Three companies out of the twelve only had financial statements with 
no accompanying integrated reports and were, thus, excluded from the research as 
the aim is to analyse CSR disclosures. One more company has been excluded from 
the sample because only 2011 and 2012 reports were found, which was insufficient 
as the analysis spans 2011 to 2013, capturing before and after the incident. In total, 
this left eight companies which had published integrated reports consistently (Carels 
et al., 2013) and these were used for the report. The following Table shows the 
respective companies:  
                                                 
4 The term ‘sample’ is not intended to imply a positivistic approach 
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Table 2: Companies in the platinum mining sector 
Abbreviation Company name Status 
AMS Anglo American Plat Ltd  
AQP Aquarius Platinum Ltd  
ATL Atlatsa Resources Corporation No integrated reports 
BAU Bauba Platinum Ltd  
EPS Eastern Platinum Ltd No integrated reports 
IMP Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd  
JBL Jubilee Platinum Plc No integrated reports 
LON Lonmin Plc  
NHM Northam Platinum Ltd  
PLL Platfields Ltd 2013 report not 
published at time of 
research  
RBP Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd  
WEZ Wesizwe Platinum Ltd  
 
The small sample size is in line with comparable interpretive studies5 as the results 
are not intended to be generalised over the whole population but rather to answer a 
specific question (Section 1.2) (Guest et al., 2013; Solomon & Maroun, 2012). The 
integrated reports were either collected from the McGregor database or from the 
respective companies’ websites (Makiwane & Padia, 2012).  
In the results and analysis, company names have not been used but instead, random 
numbers from 1 to 8 have been ascribed to them so as to preserve anonymity.  
3.4: Data collection and analysis  
An initial content analysis was carried out to gain a sense of the content and 
structure of the reports (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). The objective was to analyse the 
reports to understand the nature of the CSR information included in the integrated 
report and where this information was included. This was done through recording 
patterns and characteristics found in the data, as opposed to the specific information 
to cater for differences in reporting styles across the companies (de Villiers & 
Alexander, 2014). As the Marikana incident happened during the 2012 year, this 
                                                 
5 For example. Patten (1992) used 21 companies over two years, which translates to 42 annual reports, 
de Villiers and Alexander (2014) had 36 annual reports and Maroun and Solomon (2014) carried out 
interviews with 30 people. 
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study compared the integrated reports before and after the incident, captured by the 
2011-2013 financial years, to identify any fluctuations in the quantity of CSR 
disclosure.  
The sections of the integrated reports were used as axial codes (Carels et al., 2013), 
as shown in Table 1. The sections are consistent with those used by Carels et al 
(2013) to add to the reliability of the study and to ensure a comparative frame of 
reference with similar research on South African integrated reporting. Themes used 
by Solomon and Maroun (2012) were then used as content codes for the integrated 
reports. (Again, this ensures validity, reliability and comparability)6. The reports were 
carefully read to identify additional themes or content categories which were 
prevalent. Additional codes were included to accommodate specific themes, 
concepts or issues which are unique to the South African mining industry or are 
recommended in terms of the Global Reporting Initiative’s guidelines (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2013). This is not a threat to research quality. On the contrary, it 
ensures the exploratory potential of the research and is fully consistent with the 
approach followed by most interpretive studies (Carels et al., 2013; Solomon & 
Maroun, 2012). 
The researcher then analysed each integrated report and recorded, in tabular form, 
the number of times a specific theme was mentioned (adapted from Solomon and 
Maroun, 2012). A frequency table was generated to record the number of times a 
content code was referred to in each report, and in which sections it was mentioned. 
The frequency was counted in terms of sections where the disclosure theme was 
discussed. A sliding scale of similar nature to the one in Makiwane and Padia (2012) 
was used, and the frequencies were categorised as follows: 
Table 3: Disclosure scale 
Score Explanation 
0 No disclosure pertaining to the theme 
1 Descriptive disclosure regarding the theme (qualitative) 
1.5 Description and figures to explain the theme (combination of 
qualitative and quantitative disclosures) 
 
The reason for the differentiation between the score of 1 and 1.5 is that description is 
much more detailed and provides a more complete picture if it is accompanied by 
                                                 
6 To ensure validity, both the axial and content codes will be compared to prior studies as a 
completeness check (Carels et al., 2013) 
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figures, however, the scale of 2 was not used because although the combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data was more informative, it did not justify a double 
weighting when compared to pure qualitative data. 
Constant comparison of  segments of the text were carried out  systematically  to 
ensure consistency and accuracy (Guest et al., 2013). Due to the exploratory nature 
of the report, a scientific text analysis approach – which involves counting specific 
words or terms – was not used (Carels et al., 2013; Merkel-Davis et al., 2011). 
The cumulative change in CSR disclosure over time (CCOT) was then calculated for 
each content code. The CSR disclosure scores were totalled per company and 
content theme to determine whether there was an increase or decrease in total CSR 
disclosure post-Marikana. An increase in CSR disclosures would prove the assertion 
made by Suchman (1995) and Patten (1992) that organisations tend to offer 
extensive explanations in a bid to re-legitimise their operations. 
Due to the limited sample size and the qualitative nature of the research, inferential 
statistical methods, such as the ANOVA or regression analysis, have not been used 
but rather basic descriptive statistics are employed to compare the changes across 
the years and types of disclosures. 
The researcher also measured the general quantity of CSR disclosure found in the 
integrated reports of the companies to get a feel of the overall weight of the CSR 
disclosures in comparison to the other information contained in the integrated 
reports. This was not an exact scientific process as the intention was not to quantify a 
measure of reporting quality but  merely to gauge generally the extent of CSR 
reporting  (Guthrie & Parker, 1989). The pages dedicated to CSR were then divided 
by the total pages in the integrated report for the 2011 and 2012 years, giving the 
proportion of CSR disclosures to the entire report. This was done to determine if the 
focus on CSR did indeed change in comparison with the rest of the disclosures which 
are predominantly financial. 
In addition to the above, the researcher carefully studied the words, sentences and 
phrases used in the integrated reports to identify any traces of legitimacy theory in 
application. Extracts of examples of information that can be interpreted as designed 
to repair or maintain legitimacy of the respective companies have been provided in 
the analysis section. This includes statements which show intentions to repair 
legitimacy through denial, justification, excusing or explaining the respective 
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company’s involvement in the Marikana violence and its related consequences 
(adapted from Suchman, 1995). The reports were also read to investigate legitimacy 
maintenance which includes protecting past accomplishments and perceiving and 
proactively embracing change, as explained in Section 2.1 (adapted from 
O'Donovan, 2002; Suchman, 1995). It should be reiterated that the intention was not 
to follow a scientifically rigorous approach for analysing the content of the reports. 
Instead, the analysis was a subjective exercise which required the researcher to read 
the integrated reports several times (Solomon & Moroun, 2012) and reflect on how 
the respective companies were using their CSR reporting to maintain or repair 
legitimacy. While this data analysis process was systematic and extensive, please 
note that images7 found in the integrated reports were specifically excluded from the 
data collection and analysis process as their interpretation due to the difficulty of 
defining a consistent basis for interpreting this data. 
At this point, it should be noted that the researcher was very involved in the data 
collection and analysis process. This is not a threat to validity or reliability. With 
interpretive research, it is common for the researcher to be integrally involved in the 
evaluation of data, given the social constructivist outlook adopted by this study 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).  
  
                                                 
7 Images referred to in this instance are pictures that are part of the integrated reports. 
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4 Results 
Section 4 provides a description of the results from the data collection explained in 
Section 3.4. The results are broken down into total disclosures per company, and 
then aggregated into the whole sector as shown in the graphs below. 
4.1 Disclosures per company 
 
 
CCOT - Cumulative change over time 
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Figure 1 shows the different companies’ total disclosures, while Figure 2 shows the 
CCOT of each company’s total disclosures over the three years under review. 
Company 1 and Company 8 show increases in 2012 but in 2013 their disclosures 
dropped to a level below the initial starting point, resulting in a negative CCOT across 
the three years. Company 3 shows an increase in 2012 disclosures and a small 
decrease in 2013, leading to a positive CCOT. Company 2 and 7 show a slight 
decrease in 2012 disclosures but increased substantially in 2013, resulting in a 
positive CCOT. Companies 4 and 5 had step-up increases in both years, while 
Company 6 decreases across the three years. The exact figures are shown in Table 
4, while the percentage changes per company are shown in Table 5. 
Table 4 : Total per company 
Row Labels 2011 2012 2013 Grand Total 
Company 1 168.5 171 159 498.5 
Company 2 75.5 72.5 90 238 
Company 3 34.5 38.5 36.5 109.5 
Company 4 147.5 178 198.5 524 
Company 5 147 149 153.5 449.5 
Company 6 124 120.5 111 355.5 
Company 7 127.5 125.5 151 404 
Company 8 77.5 92 62 231.5 
Grand Total 902 947 961.5 2810.5 
 
Table 5 : Percentage changes in CSR disclosures per company 
Row Labels 2011-2012 2012-2013 2011-2013 
Company 1 1.48% -7.02% -5.64% 
Company 2 -3.97% 24.14% 19.21% 
Company 3 11.59% -5.19% 5.80% 
Company 4 20.68% 11.52% 34.58% 
Company 5 1.36% 3.02% 4.42% 
Company 6 -2.82% -7.88% -10.48% 
Company 7 -1.57% 20.32% 18.43% 
Company 8 18.71% -32.61% -20.00% 
Grand Total 4.99% 1.53% 6.60% 
 
In order to gain additional insights, the disclosures were disaggregated according to 
type (environmental, ethics and social). These disclosure types were consistent with 
those used in comparable studies (Carels et al., 2013; Solomon & Maroun, 2012).  
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4.2 Marikana-specific information 
Table 6: Marikana specific disclosures 
Company 20121 Marikana 20122 2011 CCOT 2011 to 20122 
Company1 171 1 170 168.5 1.5 
Company2 72.5 1 71.5 75.5 -4 
Company3 38.5 1 37.5 34.5 3 
Company4 178 1 177 147.5 29.5 
Company5 149 9 140 147 -7 
Company6 120.5 0 120.5 124 -3.5 
Company7 125.5 2 123.5 127.5 -4 
Company8 92 1 91 77.5 13.5 
Grand Total 947 16 931 902 29 
CCOT – Cumulative change over time. 
Table 6 shows the change when Marikana-specific disclosures were excluded from 
the integrated report frequencies observed in Table 4. The 20121 column represents 
the total CSR disclosure, including Marikana-specific, while 20122 excludes 
Marikana. An increase of 29 is still apparent in the total disclosures from 2011 to 
20122, as shown above. This is a 3.2% increase from 2011, compared to the total 
increase in disclosure of 5% from 2011 to 2012. Putting it into perspective, 64% of 
the increase in CSR disclosures from 2011 to 2012 was not Marikana-specific.  
 
Figure 3 above shows each company’s 2011 and 2012 disclosure totals, excluding 
Marikana-specific information. Four companies out of the eight still present increases 
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in total disclosure, whereas the other four show decreases in disclosure. This 
information is summarised in Table 7 below: 
Table 7 : Analysis of disclosure focus 
Extent of disclosure 
Focus of CSR disclosure  
General CSR Marikana Specific 
Above average 
decrease Company 5   
Marginal decrease Company 2, 6 and 7   
No change   Company 6 
Marginal increase Company 1 and 3 Company 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 
Above average 
increase Company 4 and 8 Company 5 
 
4.3 Frequencies per disclosure type 
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CCOT – Cumulative change over time. 
Figure 4 shows the total industry disclosures per category, being environmental, 
ethics and social disclosures, and Figure 5 shows the changes in these disclosures 
over time. Environmental disclosures decreased in 2012 but increased again in 2013, 
ending up with a CCOT was -8.5 from 2011 to 2013. Ethical disclosures increased to 
86.5 in 2012 (from 78 in 2011), then decreased by 1 in 2013. Social disclosures 
increased from 645 to 705.5 in 2012 and remained at the same level for the 2013 
year. The following Table shows the percentage changes, categorised per disclosure 
type: 
Table 8: Percentage changes in each disclosure type 
Disclosure type 2011-2012 2012-2013 2011 to 2013 
Environmental -13.41% 10.00% -4.75% 
Ethics 10.90% -1.16% 9.62% 
Social 9.38% 0.00% 9.38% 
Grand Total 4.99% 1.53% 6.60% 
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4.4 Aggregate industry disclosures 
 
 
CCOT – Cumulative change over time. 
 
Figure 6 depicts the aggregated platinum mining companies’ CSR disclosures, while 
Figure 7 shows their movement across the three years under review. The total 
disclosures were as follows: 2011 was 902, 2012 was 947 and 2013 had a grand 
total of 961.5.  The increase from 2011 to 2012 was 45 (translates to 4.99%) while 
the increase from 2012 to 2013 was 14.5 (1.53%). The total CCOT throughout the 
period was 59.5, being 6.6%. 
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The Marikana incident involved mineworkers from Lonmin Plc. As a result, the 
researcher decided to examine the changing disclosure trends in the sector, 
excluding Lonmin.  
4.5 Lonmin versus the industry 
 
Figure 8 shows the results of the platinum mining companies, excluding Lonmin. As 
shown in the graph, there is a gradual increase from 755 to 798 and finally to 808 in 
2013. The CCOT is shown in the graph below: 
 
CCOT – Cumulative change over time. 
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Figure 10 then shows Lonmin’s CSR disclosures in comparison to the rest of the 
platinum mining sector average disclosures over the 3-year period. 
 
It is evident that Lonmin consistently had more CSR disclosures than the industry 
average, both before and after the incident. The exact numbers are shown below: 
Table 9 : Lonmin compared to the industry 
Year Industry excluding Lonmin Lonmin 
2011 108 147 
2012 114 149 
2013 115 153.5 
Grand Total 337 449.5 
 
From the above it is evident that, although Lonmin did react to the incident and 
increase disclosures, the company was consistent throughout. 
Table 10 : Company year-ends 
Company Year-end 
Company 1 31 December 
Company 2 30 June 
Company 3 30 June 
Company 4 30 June 
Company 5 30 September 
Company 6 30 June 
Company 7 31 December 
Company 8 31 December 
 
30 
 
 
 
Table 10 shows the respective company year-ends. It was noted that although some 
companies had year ends that were before the Marikana incident (June), they still 
included the event in their disclosures as their financial statements had not been 
issued when it occurred. 
Figures 1 to 10 were derived from counting how many sections a particular theme is 
found in. It is, however, also important to gauge the volume of the CSR disclosure in 
comparison to the rest of the disclosures found in the integrated report to get a 
general feel of the increase or decrease in relative CSR disclosures. This information 
is depicted in Table 11 below: 
 
Table 11 shows the proportion of CSR disclosure pages compared to the total pages 
of the integrated reports, and the change in proportion after the Marikana incident. 
This table is more useful than one comparing actual page number increases because 
most companies have gradually been reducing their page numbers as they improve 
their integrated reporting as they understand that the focus of integrated reporting is 
harmonisation of information rather than quantity of disclosure (cf. Makiwane & 
Padia, 2012). To control that, the relative figure is used. This information is shown 
below: 
2011 to 2012
Company CSR pages Total pages % of CSR pagesCSR pages Total pages % of CSR pages % Change
Company 1 78 324 24.07% 75 276 27.17% 3.10%
Company 2 30 221 13.57% 16 112 14.29% 0.71%
Company 3 10 60 16.67% 14 80 17.50% 0.83%
Company 4 33 220 15.00% 61 154 39.61% 24.61%
Company 5 68 164 41.46% 58 168 34.52% -6.94%
Company 6 22 138 15.94% 28 182 15.38% -0.56%
Company 7 46 174 26.44% 64 208 30.77% 4.33%
Company 8 36 128 28.13% 60 166 36.14% 8.02%
Grand Total 323 1429 22.60% 376 1346 27.93% 5.33%
2011 report 2012 report
Table 11 : CSR weighting in integrated reports
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Table 12 : CCOT from 2011 to 2013 
Company Environmental Ethics Social Grand Total 
Company 1 -0.5 0 -9 -9.5 
Company 2 3 1 10.5 14.5 
Company 3 0 2 0 2 
Company 4 -1 2.5 49.5 51 
Company 5 -1 -1 8.5 6.5 
Company 6 -11.5 -3 1.5 -13 
Company 7 6.5 4 13 23.5 
Company 8 -4 2 -13.5 -15.5 
Grand Total -8.5 7.5 60.5 59.5 
CCOT – Cumulative change over time. 
Table 12 shows the CCOT per company for each type of disclosure class. 
Companies 1, 5, 6 and 8 appear to have decreased across two classes in the 3-year 
period but Company 5 still managed to get a positive CCOT whilst the other three 
had negative CCOTs. The other companies generally increased their disclosures 
during the period under review, as shown in the graph.  
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5 Discussion 
Section 5 provides an analysis of the results. Section 5.1 gives a preliminary 
analysis, which interprets the graphs presented in Section 4 in light of the prior 
research. Section 5.2 provides evidence of legitimisation strategies found in the 
integrated reports and links them to those identified by Suchman (1995) and 
O'Donovan (2002). 
5.1 Preliminary analysis 
As per Figures 6 and 7, there was an increase in CSR disclosure across the platinum 
mining sector post the Marikana incident. The immediate reaction to the incident 
spiked an increase of 4.99% in disclosures across the sector in the period 2011 to 
2012, and a further increase of 1.53% in the following year, as shown in Table 5.  
This supports the assertion made by Suchman (1995) and Patten (1992) that, in the 
face of unfavourable circumstances, organisations tend to explain themselves 
extensively as a way of gaining societal approval which aids them in maintaining a 
level of cognitive legitimacy. 
Marikana-specific disclosures were only introduced into the integrated reports in the 
2012 year, as they were in direct response to the incident. Although the incident 
threatened the legitimacy of the sector as a whole (cf. Bond & Mottiar, 2013) it was 
noted that only 1.69% of the CSR disclosures in the integrated reports related directly 
to the incident and its aftereffects. This is less than expected given the negative 
publicity and increased media attention attached to the incident (Deegan et al., 2002) 
and the normal trend in response to such circumstances.  Of the 4.99% general 
increase in disclosure, more than half was not related to Marikana (see Table 6), 
showing that it was more a general CSR disclosure that increased across the sector. 
Most companies referred to labour unrest in the platinum mining sector but shied 
away from constantly referring directly to the incident. Such a response is in line with 
legitimacy strategy of avoiding the core issue so as not to attract unnecessary 
attention to it (de Villiers & van Staden, 2006; O'Donovan, 2002). By increasing 
disclosure of other social activities, the public’s attention is focused on generic CSR 
issues which do not have the same emotional and political sensitivity. The effect of 
disclosure dealing specifically with Marikana is best illustrated by considering how 
CSR disclosure scores change when information dealing with the strike action is 
excluded from the final score (Table 13).  
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Table 13 : Analysis of Marikana-specific disclosures 
Company CCOT (2011-2012) CCOT (2011-2012 Excluding Marikana) 
Company 1 Increase Increase 
Company 2 Decrease Decrease 
Company 3 Increase Increase 
Company 4 Increase Increase 
Company 5 Increase Decrease 
Company 6 Decease Decrease 
Company 7 Decrease Decrease 
Company 8 Increase Increase 
CCOT – Cumulative change over time. 
As shown in Table 13, only Company 5’s overall disclosure movement was changed 
by the exclusion of Marikana information. This is because Company 5 had extensive 
Marikana disclosures which led to a decrease in their general reported CSR 
disclosure. To understand the nature of CSR disclosures better, the researcher also 
considered changes in environmental reporting.  
Figures 4, 5 and Table 8 show that environmental disclosures changed by a smaller 
proportion than social and ethical disclosures. When social disclosures were at their 
peak in 2012, environmental disclosures actually decreased by 13.41%.  This is 
possibly due to the fact that the  reasons for the challenge to legitimacy were social, 
and not directly related to  environmental and ethical compliance (cf. de Villiers & van 
Staden, 2006). In addition , government’s focus was on social issues (de Villiers & 
van Staden, 2006). The strikes were caused by problems such as lack of decent 
housing, low remuneration, safety and health concerns, all of which are in the social 
category. Companies had to prove that they were responsible, ethical and 
accountable in these. It would have been ineffective to increase environmental 
disclosures as those were not in question. Disclosures are only increased to address 
the relevant concern, not to create possible awareness of other problems in different 
areas of the company. (de Villiers & van Staden, 2006). 
The social disclosures which increased include discussions on labour unrest, 
explanations of the events leading up to strike action and how the respective 
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companies tried to negotiate with employees and their representative unions. All of 
the companies under review deal with the construction of decent housing for the 
employees, transformation policies, as well as safety measures that have been put in 
place to address workers’ and government concerns. The ethical disclosure also 
addressed the issue of employers acting responsibly by finding solutions to the 
problems raised and being accountable for their actions.  
A look at the results in the sector, excluding Lonmin, the company directly affected by 
the Marikana incident, confirms the general increase in CSR disclosures (see Figure 
8 and 9). This evidence is in line with the results found by Patten (1992) who studied 
the reports of the oil companies after the Exxon oil spill. Patten (1992) concluded that 
companies in the same sector as Exxon had significantly increased their 
environmental disclosures in a bid to legitimise their operations and regain favour in 
the public’s eyes, even though they were not directly involved with the spill. A similar 
trend is being noted in the platinum mining sector post-Marikana. Although not all 
individual companies increased their disclosures (see Figure 1 and 2), the total 
sector disclosure increased (as shown in Figure 6 and 7), supporting the legitimacy 
theory application. 
Those companies which did not increase their total CSR disclosures (see Figure 1) 
appear to provide evidence in support of Guthrie and Parker (1989) who disputed  
the relevance of legitimacy theory for explaining changes in non-financial reporting. 
The researchers argued that legitimacy theory did not apply because there was no 
significant change in CSR disclosures during times when a company’s reputation 
was at stake. Deegan et al. (2002), however, have refuted Guthrie and Parker’s 
(1989) assertion. The general consensus is that legitimacy theory is relevant for 
explaining changes in CSR disclosure (de Villiers & van Staden, 2006). In this 
context , a more reasonable interpretation to explain the decrease in disclosure by 
companies 1 3 and 8 (Tables 4 & 5) is provided by  de Villiers and van Staden 
(2006). These companies increase disclosures in the time of crisis (increase of 
1.48%, 11.59% and 18.71% in 2012, respectively) but subsequently reduce 
disclosures to avoid unnecessary attention (decrease of 7.02%, 5.19% and 32.61% 
respectively). This is because the pending issue will have been addressed and 
companies then return to ‘normal business’. The change in disclosure is designed to 
signal this, indicating to the reader that the companies have acknowledged the 
relevance of the Marikana incident but that, in the following financial year, the social 
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unrest does not have the same relevance to the companies’ operations (de Villiers 
and van Staden, 2006). In other words – and as explained by Suchman (1995) – the 
reporting strategy is intended to suggest that Marikana is not indicative of long-term 
impact which characterises operations after 2012.  
Consider, for example, Company 6. Although it is one of the largest players in the 
industry, it experienced most of its strike action during the 2011 financial year and 
was largely unaffected by the 2012 strikes which plagued the industry. This explains 
the reduction in its disclosures from 124 in 2011 to 120.5 in 2012 and a further 
decrease in 2013 to 111 (as shown in Table 4). To this company, 2011 would have 
had the highest disclosures in direct response to the strike action in their operations. 
In 2012, they avoid extensive disclosures on labour unrest as this would re-focus 
unnecessary attention to their operations and cause possible societal disapproval. 
This is consistent with de Villiers and van Staden (2006) who argue that companies 
may actually decrease certain CSR disclosures as a legitimacy tool. This means that, 
even the companies which decreased their disclosures over the period under review 
were doing so as a legitimacy strategy. This is because legitimacy strategies involve 
a change in disclosure patterns to influence perceptions, not merely an increase (de 
Villiers & van Staden, 2006).  
However, it is noteworthy that these companies did not exhibit any obvious 
similarities which could highlight why they chose to decrease their disclosure as a 
legitimacy strategy. Companies 1, 3 and 6 were established companies, while 
company 8 was still in its research and development phase. Similarly, other 
established organisations, such as Company 4, increased disclosure over the period 
under review. Examining the extent to which the size and nature of operations may 
be interconnected with legitimacy strategies was not specifically within the scope of 
this research. This is one of the proposed areas for future research (Section 6.3). 
Overall, the results lead to a conclusion that legitimacy is of importance to the mining 
companies, as traces of its application can be seen in the above analysis. In light of 
this, specific company disclosures have been selected from the integrated reports 
which provide evidence of legitimacy strategies as referred to by Suchman (1995) in 
application. 
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5.2: Evidence of legitimisation strategies  
As discussed in Section 5.1 when companies are faced with a crisis which 
challenges their legitimacy, they tend to employ strategies to address the situation 
(O'Donovan, 2002; Suchman, 1995). The strategies are to repair the legitimacy if it 
was already damaged, and to maintain it if it was just shaken. Examples of such 
strategies in action have been selected from the 2012 integrated reports and are 
presented below, classified into their respective classes as discussed in Section 
2.1.2.  
5.2.1 Diverting attention 
In order to repair their legitimacy, all companies used diversion methods (Table 
13, Section 5.2.3). However, most diversion strategies were not direct. They 
were implicit in that companies did not emphasise the  negative aspects of the 
strike action but were quick to point out the positive that they themselves had 
achieved during the period (O'Donovan, 2002). Consider the following examples:  
“While there have been disappointments along the way, there have, 
undeniably, been many highlights to celebrate and to look back upon with 
satisfaction” (Article 11). 
“We recognise the right of our employees to freedom of association and to 
collective bargaining. Our remuneration practices will be determined 
according to local market conditions and we will strive to ensure that we pay 
wages that are, as a minimum, adequate to satisfy the basic needs of our 
employees and their families” (Article 2) 
In the above statements, the companies attempt to divert the attention of the readers 
from the negative issues surrounding the industry because of Marikana, to the good 
that the companies have achieved during 2012. This is because the preparers of the 
reports believe that the public will focus more on the information that is provided in 
greater detail, hence the need to emphasise the good and try to ignore the bad which  
occurred (cf. O'Donovan, 2002). 
This is consistent with O'Donovan (2002) who found that managers were not likely to 
ignore completely the adverse event as this could possibly be worse than focusing 
extensively on it. Instead, disclosure would be made about the event but kept to a 
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minimum. Any opportunity to divert attention from the negative to the positive CSR 
embarked on during the period was welcome, as explained by Suchman (1995).  
As part of the same  strategy, O'Donovan (2002) explained that companies would 
avoid entering into public debate to justify themselves. The following statement was 
extracted from one of the integrated reports: 
“Of course, the issues around Marikana are the subject of an on-going 
judicial inquiry in South Africa. It is for Judge Farlam and his team, whom we 
support fully and completely, to establish causes and examine effects, and 
we do not intend to do that here. It would be entirely wrong to do so” (Article 
14). 
The natural response to the accusations included in multiple media reports and 
journal articles (Alexander, 2013; Nkosi, 2012) would have been to enter into debates 
and justify the company’s actions. This, however, would have attracted more 
unnecessary attention from stakeholders (cf. O'Donovan, 2002). By publicly 
supporting due process and the legal bodies  set up to investigate the incident, the 
company  conforms to societal norms (O'Donovan, 2002), tries to prove that it has 
nothing to conceal and signals the acceptance of the dominant legal system in order 
to gain legitimacy (cf. Suchman, 1995). 
5.2.2 Altering stakeholders’ expectations  
Suchman (1995) asserts that companies facing legitimacy challenges may engage in 
extensive explanations to stakeholders as a form of re-igniting a level of cognitive 
legitimacy (Section 2.1.2). Cognitive legitimacy, as explained in Section 2.1.1, can be 
won if the organisations can provide an account of their operations which is generally 
accepted by powerful constituents. At the same time an organisation can appeal to a 
sense of procedural and exchange legitimacy if it is able to offer an explanation for a 
negative event which reflects it in a positive light (Section 2.1.2). This is evident from 
Article 20 which had a section dealing with the strike action in detail, as well as the 
organisation’s attempts to stop the violence and negotiate with employees.  
“….having reviewed their demands, we agreed with the unions to make 
some improvements in terms of the variable portion of their remuneration, 
which depends on their productivity.These disgruntled employees rejected 
this offer because they wanted a fixed rate increase and immediately 
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resumed the strike. During the strike we set up a 24-hour communications 
centre to manage the incidents of violence and intimidation reported to us 
and also to ensure that we could communicate with our employees and they 
could also share their experiences and expectations with us during this 
period. [Company X] called on the South African Police Services to assist us 
in managing the violence and intimidation that was taking place, and also 
used a helicopter to monitor what was happening on the ground, so we 
could direct the police to trouble spots, secure our property and keep our 
employees safe” (Article 20).  
In this example, the company provides a normalising account of the strike action. It is 
careful not to state explicitly that it is not accountable for the event taking place at 
Marikana lest this be seen as insensitive or socially irresponsible (Suchman, 1995) 
Instead, language is used to justify the company’s actions and deflect blame. The 
organisation presents itself as taking all of the steps which one would reasonably 
expect in the context of the growing labour unrest. It also suggests (again subtly) that 
there were a group of ‘disgruntled’ workers who were undermining efforts to resolve 
the strike action peacefully and from whom the remaining employees needed to be 
kept “safe”.   
This account provides one reason for the increase in CSR disclosure reported in 
Section 4 (see Figure 6 and 7). What is important to note is that the disclosures were 
not only generic (Solomon and Maroun, 2012). As indicated by Table 6, when faced 
with a significant threat to legitimacy many companies dealt in detail with the 
Marikana incident as part of a concerted strategy to reassure stakeholders that they 
were aware of the impact of the crisis (influential legitimacy) and their responses 
were appropriate (procedural legitimacy). Consider, for example, the following 
comments:  
“The Board was deeply saddened by the violent unrest which took place 
during this time and continues to express its profound sympathy to those 
affected, including the families, friends and colleagues of those who 
died…….The Company then worked resolutely to resolve the tensions within 
the various factions of the workforce in order to create an environment 
where a return to work was possible” (Article 14). 
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In addition to the above, an organisation may rely on an indirect strategy to maintain 
or repair legitimacy. As explained by Suchman (1995), emphasising a negative event 
can have unintended consequences and lead to additional criticism by stakeholders. 
In this context, a common strategy was to rely on subtle appeals to the exchange 
legitimacy, convincing society that the respective company still deserves to exist. 
This was done primarily by pointing out all the benefits that the mining houses 
continuously give to society, as seen in the example below:  
“Alongside our legal and regulatory obligations, we believe that it is 
necessary to earn our social licence to operate from the people and 
communities who host our operations through creating economic value by 
contributing to addressing their needs and challenges. We have engaged 
with and invested heavily in our local communities over many years and one 
of the key obligations we have assumed under our social and labour plan is 
improving our employees living conditions. To that end, we have focused on 
constructing houses and converting the former single-sex hostel 
accommodation into bachelor and family housing units. We continue to 
support our workforce in improving their general health and we recognise 
our environmental obligations” (Article 14). 
Another similar statement is shown below: 
“[Company X] acknowledges its responsibility to the communities in and 
around its operations, and aims to provide meaningful developmental, 
financial, technical and other support to improve the lives of community 
members, and to eliminate or minimise any negative impacts of mining. In 
the medium to longer term, the Company intends to contribute to the 
sustainability of these communities and the development of their members 
beyond the lives of our operations” (Article 5). 
The intention is not necessarily to mislead stakeholders (Solomon et al., 2013). 
Instead, the companies appeal to a sense of exchange, procedural and structural 
legitimacy, where they explain to the public how they have discharged their 
responsibilities for community development (exchange) in a timely and systematic 
manner (procedure), even though the consequences (consequential legitimacy) may 
have been unfavourable. In this way, the respective business models are presented 
as socially responsible and the respective organisations appear as a rational and 
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natural part of the social context. The end result is that the existence of these 
businesses as a credible part of the economy is taken for granted and alternatives 
become unthinkable (cf. Suchman, 1995). This re-ignites a level of cognitive 
legitimacy, where the public cannot imagine life without the organisation. 
The intention possibly is to alter society’s expectations and perceptions of the 
respective organisations to the point where stakeholders either condone the 
organisation’s involvement in Marikana or are prepared to accept it as an unusual 
event for which the respective company cannot reasonably be held accountable. In 
this context, a focus point is the perceived relationship between capitalism and 
Apartheid-related social injustices (Section 2.4). 
With talks of mine nationalisation already tabled by government before the Marikana 
incident (de Villiers & van Staden, 2006), the mining houses faced a growing threat of 
public policy intervention due to the public outcry, as explained by Patten (1992). The 
parallels drawn between Apartheid violence and the Marikana incident opened room 
for more scrutiny and criticism. This resulted in the need to address the issue of 
social inequality while stressing the importance of generating financial returns.  To 
this end, all of the companies under review dealt with key social metrics in their 
integrated reports such as worker housing, HIV/Aids and occupational health and 
safety. As explained by de Villiers and van Staden (2006), these are important issues 
(and a legacy of worker exploitation under Apartheid). As per Figure 4, it is no 
surprise that companies – faced with additional scrutiny after Marikana – devote 
attention to these issues in their integrated reports. What must also be emphasised is 
the continued relevance of the capital market. De Villiers and van Staden (2006) 
explain how South Africa, despite moving towards a more socialist system of 
government, still depends on free market systems (Section 2.4). Consequently, 
although all companies deal with the social implications of Marikana (Figure 4, 
Section 4.3), they pay particular attention to explaining the financial impact of the 
strike action. 
“What is clear, though, is that if South Africa is to deal with the historic 
issues of poverty and dissatisfaction which underpin much of the unrest we 
have witnessed, it will require a growing and effective private sector to 
provide the jobs so desperately needed. It is business which will help to 
deliver much of the growth which, in turn, will help to provide the economic, 
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educational and social platforms for change. Given the country’s extensive 
natural resources, mining will be a key part of that” (Article 14). 
The above statement appeals to pragmatic legitimacy as it offers society actual 
benefits from the continuance and support of the private sector. Societal values of 
nationalisation of the sector being the solution are questioned and capitalism is 
instead given as the more logical solution if society expects anything in return 
(exchange legitimacy).  
5.2.3 Managing blame  
Under this strategy, companies try to shape what society thinks of them. Companies 
may selectively accept blame but deny ultimate responsibility, as shown below: 
“It was easy to blame Lonmin, as some have done, for the spread of unrest 
in the weeks after our agreement. We reject this accusation. Unrest in the 
mining sector predated the Marikana dispute, and was growing elsewhere 
during it. Deep-rooted issues of poverty and inequality have been 
highlighted by what has taken place, but those go beyond mining and to 
every corner of South Africa. It is certainly true that mining companies have 
faced criticism for their efforts to support the transformation agenda in the 
country and, on Lonmin’s behalf, we accept that we must do more, 
particularly around the nationally difficult issue of housing” (Article 14) 
The perceptions of society were that Lonmin was to blame for all the violence in the 
sector (Alexander, 2013; Nkosi, 2012) but the above attempts to correct this view. 
Blame is denied but  the company does not seek completely to absolve itself from 
any responsibility as Suchman (1995) warns that this could  backfire. Instead, the 
strategy is to emphasise that more could have been done on the CSR front while 
rejecting the view that the company should be held accountable for Marikana (as an 
example of a broader socio-economic issue beyond the company’s control). 
Other companies, particularly those not directly involved in Marikana, were more 
overt. Several examples were found where organisations were more explicit in 
denying responsibility and shifting the blame to others. This, in essence, serves to 
justify the organisation by its jurisdiction and presenting negative CSR issues as 
beyond the entity’s control (cf. Suchman, 1995). An example is shown below: 
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“…the substantial operational challenges related to two months of 
unprotected and violent illegal industrial action linked to unrealistic wage 
demands...” (Article 2) 
The above statement supports Suchman (1995)’s strategy of questioning the 
company’s moral responsibility. The blame is shifted to the workers and their 
respective unions who were supposedly making unrealistic demands, leading to the 
strike action, for which the company would not accept responsibility, based on the 
above statement.  
“The violence and intimidation attendant on the strike have to be 
condemned in the strongest terms. The brutality displayed by a minority was 
shocking in the extreme” (Article 11). 
This shows that the company has taken a moral stand against violence and it 
appeals to dispositional legitimacy as there are signs of moral values associated with 
the organisation’s beliefs (Suchman, 1995). The organisation has ascribed a non-
violent personality to itself, and will condemn it outright. This also serves to distance 
the company from the violence as it shows that the company did not approve of it. In 
this way, the company attempts to draw a line between normal business and the 
violent strike action. Suchman (1995) refers to this as a “firewall”, which ensures that 
the event is seen as a once-off incident and is not used to assess the general 
operations of the company. 
In some instances, companies may even opt to share the blame and show that, 
although they did contribute to the adverse event, there were many other 
circumstances that were beyond their control. The idea is that full responsibility 
should not only rest with them, as shown below: 
“The incidents at Lonmin’s Marikana mine and the wildcat strikes across the 
mining industry in subsequent months catapulted the sector and South 
Africa onto the global platform. Labour unrest and lawlessness, fuelled by 
union rivalry, community discontent with the lack of social delivery by the 
state, and political posturing in advance of the leading party’s electoral 
conference in late 2012 inflamed and undermined the fragile social structure 
of the industry” (Article 5, emphasis added). 
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This statement is an example of blame being shifted to the government and the 
unions, leaving almost none attributable to any of the mining houses. It is noteworthy 
that this statement was not in Lonmin’s integrated report but in another company in 
the sector’s report that sought to limit blame. A similar statement was found in 
another integrated report: 
“This violence was partially related to grievances over service delivery and 
perpetrated by elements with other agendas and was linked to workplace 
issues which underscores the importance of all elements of civil society – 
employers, employees, communities and government – working hard to 
prevent a repeat” (Article 11, emphasis added). 
This offers an explanation of the circumstances surrounding the strike action and its 
possible causes. The companies, however, did not state that they are completely 
blameless, as Suchman (1995) warns that this  may only work in the short-term but 
has the potential to diminish the accumulated legitimacy in the long-run. The blame is 
rather shared with government as service delivery is named as one of the causes of 
the violent strike action.  
While organisations may choose to share the blame, those not directly involved were 
quick to point that out and distance themselves from the adverse event. This was 
seen mainly with companies which were not directly affected by the strike action. 
Although none explicitly disassociated itself from Lonmin and AMCU, the statements 
made did so implicitly. An example is shown below: 
“We developed a communication strategy and implemented a 
communication plan designed to achieve regular transparent communication 
with our workforce. This approach helped us minimise the impact on our 
operations of the labour unrest that shook the South African platinum 
industry in the second half of the year” (Article 20).  
The above statement was found on two different pages of the same report, 
emphasising the point so that stakeholders can understand that the respective 
company has set itself apart from the rest of the industry when it comes to labour 
relations. The industry was flooded by violent strikes due to poor labour relations 
(Alexander, 2013; Chinguno, 2013), something which the company had mastered 
and excelled in. This company did not want to be associated with the condemned 
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violence in the sector and  used a strategy to disassociate itself from the other 
companies (cf. Suchman, 1995). The same article contained the following statement: 
“Due to the focus of our stakeholder engagement strategy on continually 
engaging with our employees and communities to strengthen our 
relationship with them and build mutually beneficial partnerships, we were 
fortunate to be less affected by the strikes than other members of our 
industry” (Article 20). 
In the two statements above, the company distances itself from the violence in the 
sector by appealing to the public’s moral legitimacy as the emphasis is not just on 
avoiding strikes and violence but on treating workers fairly to avoid unrest. This 
shows some level of procedural legitimacy  as the emphasis is on the process of 
preventing the strike action rather than on the result of being less affected by strikes 
(cf. Suchman, 1995). In addition to the procedural legitimacy, the statement has 
traces of influential legitimacy as it shows a level of stakeholder engagement in 
decision-making, thus allowing the affected parties to have a say in the issues that 
affect them. This is meant to change society’s perceptions about the entity. 
Organisations may use a different method to influence society’s perceptions which 
entails ensuring that their prior social and governance-related successes overshadow 
isolated negative events. Legitimacy has its roots in the historic actions of the 
organisation (Suchman, 1995). The past accomplishments and values are the reason 
why the company gained legitimacy: holding onto them ensures that society sees 
past the event and writes it off as an anomaly. Examples of this strategy are shown 
below: 
“However we are rightly proud of the huge amount we have achieved in 
education, health, infrastructure and other areas, both for our employees 
and the wider community – work which has not had the recognition the 
dedicated teams who deliver it deserve” (Article 14). 
“In this area we should acknowledge that our Group’s great investment in 
training and skills development has resulted in the creation of a sizeable 
body of knowledge and expertise that adds unmeasurable value to the 
societies and economies of both South Africa and Zimbabwe” (Article 11). 
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“Our achievements on the provision of family housing and in converting our 
hostels into one-person-per-room accommodation have involved significant 
investment and will translate into lasting benefits both for our employees 
and for the creation of a more stable, more productive workforce. We still 
have much to do but we have made great strides in this most important 
area. The recently launched Platinum Village will provide 2 500 decent 
homes for colleagues” (Article 11). 
The above statements show two companies’ efforts to protect their past 
accomplishments in the face of widespread criticism of the mining houses as a whole  
(see, for example, Chinguno, 2013). Companies tend to continuously stockpile good 
deeds when there is no social crisis, and conveniently remind society of such 
instances in the face of a crisis (cf. Suchman, 1995). Reminding society of the good 
CSR that had been done in the past might serve as a source of cognitive legitimacy. 
This is because when there is a crisis, society is quick to focus  on the negative and 
possibly lobby for public policy intervention (Patten, 1992). Reminding stakeholders 
of the positive performed by the companies facing legitimacy attacks serves to 
convince society that they cannot continue successfully without the contribution of 
the company. This explains the increase in CSR disclosure which is Non-Marikana 
related (Figure 3).  
From a slightly different perspective, another company suggested that society’s 
perceptions were unfair. Their report argues that stakeholders are quick to judge in 
times of crisis, overlooking the material social and economic contribution of the 
platinum sector. At the same time, the company also attempts to secure legitimacy, 
not by directly justifying or responding to a delegitimising event but by altering the 
standards according to which they are evaluated. Consider the following statement: 
“As a society we should be deeply concerned about the raised 
expectations and demands on our sector. What has become obvious in 
the aftermath of these developments, are the glaring misconceptions 
amongst our stakeholders about the state of the PGM sector, its 
contributions to the economy over decades, its role as a major employer, 
provider of infrastructure and utilities, villages and communities in areas 
where there has traditionally been sparse economic activity. Now, more than 
ever, it is incumbent on all stakeholders to act responsibly and to 
discharge their responsibilities judiciously and diligently. The mining industry 
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cannot be fingered as a singular contributor to poverty and its associated ills 
in rural communities” (Article 17). 
In the above statement, the organisation is personified and presented as acting in 
line with generally accepted social norms.  A good character appeals to dispositional 
legitimacy as it allows society to judge the organisation based on its values and not 
based on an isolated, unfortunate incident (Suchman, 1995).   
5.2.4 Adhering to society’s values 
The final strategy is a direct reaction to the society’s expectations. It involves actions 
that show commitment on the organisation’s side to prevent recurrence of such 
events in future. The organisation corrects some structural defects that it may have 
had so as to give the impression that the problem has been addressed (Suchman, 
1995). The following is an example: 
“Conscious of the imperative to achieve zero harm, [Company X] has 
created two new executive-level positions related to the safety and health of 
our employees” (Article 2). 
The above shows how one of the companies has reacted to the unfavourable strike 
action which had arisen mainly as a result of poor working conditions and lack of 
safety for the workers. This is an example of the restructuring strategy achieved 
through creation of “watchdogs” who are to help prevent such adverse events as the 
violent strike action and government intervention in future (cf. Suchman, 1995; Tilling 
& Tilt, 2010). By creating new positions for monitoring and governance, the company 
is implicitly admitting that its system was flawed and that they are taking remedial 
action. This strategy is also apparent in the following extract from one of the 
integrated reports under review: 
 “To help mitigate against future potential unrest and associated challenges 
in the sector, [Company X] ushered in a new era in stakeholder engagement 
with the appointment to the executive team of a new Executive for 
Stakeholder Relations and Corporate Affairs to oversee this new 
stakeholder engagement approach” (Article 23). 
The above involves acknowledging areas for improvement and the identification of 
possible remedial action (Suchman, 1995), to avoid a repeat of the situation. The 
creation of additional positions in the company helps to address the structural 
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legitimacy of the organisation by aligning its structures to the expectations of society. 
In order to appear completely transparent and accepting of  change, companies 
welcome additional monitoring which  is meant to assure society of no recurrences of 
the adverse event (Suchman, 1995): 
“Dialogue with representatives of the Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR) will be stepped up in an effort to address concerns related to the 
application of Section 54 stoppages. We will cooperate fully with the DMR to 
ensure that our operations comply with and ideally exceed agreed safety 
standards” (Article 11). 
The above invitation for stakeholders to have a significant say in the company’s day-
to-day decision-making is linked to influential legitimacy. It is important to be seen as 
cooperative with the community and government in preventing a repeat of the violent 
unrest. Allowing the affected stakeholders to have a say in the corporation’s 
decisions is a sign of on-going commitment and a valuable source of legitimacy (cf. 
Suchman, 1995). 
In order to appeal to procedural legitimacy, the organisations attempt to amend the 
root causes of the strike actions, and not merely the consequences. This is to be 
done through cementing the relationships that had been unstable, as shown below: 
“Following the strike in August and September 2012 [Company X] is 
rebuilding relationships with employees. This includes at Company level a 
full engagement strategy with all unions and at an industry level, discussions 
on moving to collective bargaining for the platinum sector. Rebuilding solid 
relationships and trust will take time but is something that the Board and 
management are committed to” (Article 14). 
It is interesting to note that in their 2011 integrated report, the above company had 
identified a breakdown in employee relations as one of their principal risks, implying 
that they foresaw the possible crisis. Suchman (1995) explains that perceiving 
possible changes is paramount in maintaining organisational legitimacy, as this gives 
the company the opportunity to solve the problems proactively. The statement then 
serves to show that they are reacting to the situation and preventing any future 
recurrences. 
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The companies seem to have reacted to the wide-spread unrest through creation of 
formal, logical procedures, which shows some concerted effort to address the issues 
in a systematic manner. This method appeals to procedural legitimacy, which is 
obtained through doing things the right way, in spite of the end result. By doing things 
the right way, the company adopts societal values and uses them to tailor changes in 
their structure or procedures. The strategies used by all the companies in the sector 
have been summarised in Section 5.2.5 below. 
5.2.5 Summary of strategies 
Table 14 : Summary of Legitimacy strategies used 
Company 
CCOT  
2011-2013 
Strategy 
1 
Strategy 
2 
Strategy 
3 
Strategy 
4 
Company 1 -9.5    
Company 2 14.5    
Company 3 2   × × 
Company 4 51    
Company 5 6.5    
Company 6 -13  ×  × 
Company 7 23.5    × 
Company 8 -15.5    
Grand 
Total 59.5 8 7 7 5 
CCOT – Cumulative change over time. 
Table 14 shows the legitimacy strategies adopted by each company in addressing 
the adverse situation faced by the industry because of the violent strike actions. The 
strategies were explained in Section 2 of this report. 
Although Companies 1 and 8 decreased the quantity of their disclosures over time 
(Table 14), they still employed all the categories of legitimacy strategies (Table 14). 
This suggests that, although the quantity may have decreased, the content still 
addressed the issue at hand, thus providing support for relevance of legitimacy 
theory in the context of CSR reporting.  
In contrast, Company 6 decreased the quantity of its disclosures (Table 14) and only 
used two out of the four strategies mentioned above. In addition to that, they did not 
have any Marikana-specific disclosure. The reason for this, as explained above, was 
that the company was not subject to the strike action in 2012. The strategies used by 
Company 6 are in line with this fact as they avoided focusing on the negative events 
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affecting other companies, which would possibly invite the unwelcome scrutiny into 
their own operations (Suchman, 1995). This attests to the evidence raised by de 
Villiers and van Staden (2006) that companies may decrease disclosure whilst still 
attempting to legitimise their operations. In this light, the decrease in disclosure and 
limited application of strategies to gain or repair legitimacy is not inconsistent with the 
view that organisational legitimacy is important (O'Donovan, 2002; Patten, 1992; 
Suchman, 1995). On the contrary, the variations in the extent of disclosure 
highlighted in Section 4, coupled with differences in the emphasis placed on different 
legitimisation strategies, shows how subjective the reporting process is. As explained 
by O'Donovan (2002), companies are responding to a perceived threat to legitimacy 
which cannot be directly measured. How they react to negative issues is largely a 
result of management’s assessment of the gravity of the matter and how best to deal 
with it.  
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6 Conclusion 
This Section is divided into three. Section 6.1 summarises the findings from the 
research. Section 6.2 explains the contribution of the research; Section 6.3 gives 
recommendations for future research. 
6.1 Summary of findings 
The aim of this research is to explore the integrated reports of South African platinum 
mining companies in order to identify strategies used to maintain and repair 
legitimacy post the Marikana incident. The incident occurred on the 16 August 2012, 
marking the culmination of a year characterised by violent labour unrest in the 
platinum mining sector  (Chinguno, 2013). Some miners were shot dead and several 
others injured, leading to the local and international scrutiny of the South African 
mining industry’s future (Cavvadas & Mitchell, 2012). This perceived threat to 
legitimacy led to a move to manage the social licence to operate (cf. Deegan, 2002; 
Suchman, 1995) as it awakened painful memories of similar incidents that had been 
condemned during Apartheid (Alexander, 2013; Bond & Mottiar, 2013; Nkosi, 2012). 
The research findings refer to evidence of such strategies. 
Content analysis was employed to analyse the integrated reports, in line with prior 
studies of a similar nature (Deegan et al., 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Patten, 
1992). A disclosure checklist of themes summarising King-III and GRI 
recommendations on CSR reporting was adapted from Solomon and Moroun (2012) 
and Carels et al (2013). This was used to analyse each section of the integrated 
report. In addition, interpretive text analysis was used to analyse extracts of the 
integrated reports that could be classified into specific strategies for managing 
legitimacy in the context of a social crisis  
A general increase in CSR reporting was evident from not only Lonmin, the company 
directly affected by the Marikana incident, but also from the platinum mining houses 
in aggregate. These results are similar to Patten’s (1992) findings after the Exxon oil 
spill. The increase in disclosure provides support for the legitimacy theory (Suchman, 
1995) that companies tend to offer extensive explanations to the society so as to be 
understood and so preserve some level of cognitive legitimacy.  
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This increase, however, is not applicable to each company, as three out of the eight 
companies analysed show cumulative decreases in disclosure over the three-year 
period under review. Two of the companies initially increased disclosure in the heat 
of the Marikana crisis, and then subsequently decreased it in 2013 (Figure 1 and 2). 
This is in line with de Villiers and van Staden (2006) who found that companies 
increase disclosures to address a crisis but thereafter decrease them to avoid any 
further unwelcome attention and scrutiny. One company decreased across all years 
and (upon further investigation) it was discovered that it had experienced its phase of 
labour unrest in 2011 which corresponded with the maximum level of CSR reporting.  
The data analysis also revealed that the increases in CSR disclosure were more 
general than Marikana-specific, with the exception of one company. Sixty-four per-
cent of the increase in disclosure from 2011 to 2012 was not Marikana-specific, 
meaning that companies diverted attention from the Marikana incident to other CSR 
issues, as predicted by Suchman (1995) and O'Donovan (2002). 
The researcher then categorised the strategies used by each of the companies, as 
described by O'Donovan (2002). There are four main strategies identified, and each 
of them is made up of different actions working together for the common goal of 
repairing and maintaining legitimacy.  
The first strategy was mainly concerned with diverting attention from the negative 
event. This was achieved through paying minimal attention to the unpopular violent 
unrest, while re-directing the readers’ focus to the positive events and CSR 
accomplishments. Another method of doing this was avoiding entering into public 
debates rather leaving the decision to the Farlam Commission of Enquiry8 set up by 
the President of the Republic to investigate issues surrounding the shootings at 
Marikana. 
The second strategy involved altering society’s expectations by giving extensive 
explanations about the circumstances surrounding the labour unrest. This led to the 
increase in CSR disclosure referred to above. In addition to this, the strategy involved 
creating an appreciation of the organisation and its merchandise so as to be seen as 
contributing more good than harm to the society. 
                                                 
8 This is a panel appointed by the President to investigate issues that pertained to the Marikana-incident 
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The third legitimacy strategy was managing the blame. In this context, organisations 
not affected by the strikes sought to distance themselves from the violence in the 
sector, while those affected shifted the blame to government, the unions and other 
social sectors. As part of this, organisations also tried to protect their past 
achievements so that all their good work would not be forgotten in the face of the 
crisis. The final strategy is best described as giving in to societal expectations. This 
involved selectively accepting the blame for some flaws in the system, and 
addressing those through structural changes or executive replacement. 
In summary, it was found that companies made use of all types of strategies, with the 
exception of one company, which both decreased disclosures and made use of only 
two of the specified strategies. What this suggests is the nature and extent of CSR 
disclosure is not driven by an exact process. Legitimacy cannot be directly observed 
or quantified: it is a social phenomenon. Companies are required to interpret the 
extent to which an adverse event has impacted their standing and how best to deal 
with this. In turn, this translates into variations in legitimacy strategy with 
organisations relying on the strategies discussed in Section 2.1.2 (see Table 7). This 
research has not been able to conclude on what drives the choice or focus of the 
legitimisation strategy. What is clear is that legitimacy strategies are evident from the 
platinum mining houses’ integrated reports post the Marikana-incident. This confirms 
Hopwood’s (1987) assertion that accounting is more than just the numbers: it is a 
social science. 
6.2 Contribution of the research 
The research adds to the existing literature on the use of CSR disclosures as a 
legitimacy tool (Deegan et al., 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Patten, 1992; Tilling & 
Tilt, 2010) . The prior studies mainly analysed one company’s reaction to a series of 
negative events over a long period of time9. This research uses a similar process for 
exploring CSR disclosure to Patten (1992), who assessed the reaction of companies 
in the oil industry to the Exxon oil spill. Giving a South African context, and based on 
one of the controversial issues in the history of South Africa, this research provides 
insight into how companies have sought to regain favour in the eyes of the public. 
South Africa has had legitimacy-related research conducted in prior years (de Villiers 
                                                 
9 Guthrie & Parker (1989) as well as Deegan et al (2002) studied the reports of BHP reports for and 
100 and 15 years respectively, while Tilling and Tilt (2009) studied the reports of Rothman from 1956 
to 1999. 
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& van Staden, 2006), however, to the researcher’s knowledge; none has been done 
on a specific event as in this report. This report adds valuable insight to the field of 
corporate disclosures being more than just value-relevant but also legitimacy driven. 
Finally, the study makes an important contribution by adding to the limited body of 
interpretive research dealing with corporate governance (including organisational 
legitimacy) in an African setting (Brennan & Solomon, 2008). 
6.3 Recommendations for future research 
There are several aspects that this research does not explore. Firstly, the influence of 
size and nature of operations was not considered. Previous studies have explored 
these determinants in developed countries (Naser et al., 2006), but to the 
researcher’s knowledge, none has been done in South Africa, more so specifically in 
respect of the Marikana-incident. This would be a valuable contribution to the field of 
research. 
A deep analysis of theory was not delved into, as the report focused more on overall 
analysis of the reports than linking each point to a part of the legitimacy theory. The 
theory was used as a background to the research. This leaves room for future 
research to look into a deeper theoretical understanding of the CSR disclosures 
related to the Marikana incident, particularly in the context of integrated reporting. 
In addition, this research limited the source of information to integrated reports which 
are issued once a year and are therefore, compressed. A look into the media 
sources, particularly press conferences during and after the labour unrest might 
provide a more detailed understanding of the immediate reactions and strategies 
used to maintain or regain favour in the public’s eyes. These extra sources of 
information have been excluded from prior studies of a similar nature (Guthrie & 
Parker, 1989) due to possible journalistic bias. However, some insight into the other 
sources of disclosure might provide additional, valuable analysis. 
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Appendix 1 
The first table provides the sections usually found in the integrated report. 
Table 1 - Integrated report sections (Carels et al., 2013; Solomon & Maroun, 2012) 
CODE DESCRIPTIONS 
BD Summary of the Board members and key officers/committees 
CS Chairman’s statement (letter or equivalent) 
FS Consolidated financial statements  
CER Chief Executive Officer’s review 
CFR Chief Financial Officer’s report 
DR Director’s Report (in financial statements) 
CGR Corporate Governance review 
FR Financial review (at start of report) 
IGO Introductory Group overview (or equivalent, at start of report, summary 
operational review) 
OR Operational review – general and by subsidiary 
OP/M Our Products (or equivalent, at start of report)/our markets 
RR Remuneration/compensation  report 
SS Strategy statements (at start of report) 
SRSUM Strategic Risk summary 
VV Value added statements 
SDC Sustainable development and commentary 
SA Segmental analysis and summarised financial information 
EP External appraisals 
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Table 2-Themes (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013; Solomon & Maroun, 2012) 
Table 2 classifies the disclosures into theme codes as explained above for each 
respective year. 
Theme 2011 2012 2013 CCOT 
SOCIAL         
Absenteeism         
Black economic 
empowerment, broad–based 
black economic empowerment 
(BBBEE), construction charter, 
ownership 
        
Board diversity, gender equity, 
women in engineering 
        
Collective bargaining (GRI)/ 
Labour unions 
        
Community development         
Directors' remuneration         
Disability and invalidity 
coverage (GRI) 
        
Disability injury frequency rate         
Disciplinary action         
Employee health care/Life 
insurance (GRI) 
        
Employee remuneration         
Employee retention rate/talent 
retention 
        
Employee satisfaction/rating         
Employee stock ownership 
(GRI) 
        
Employee training / education/ 
Skills/ skills development/ 
maths, science/ skill shortages 
        
Employee turnover         
Employees trained per annum         
Fatalities         
HIV/AIDS         
Housing         
Human rights training, activism 
and reported incidents(GRI) 
        
Labour grievances filed and 
resolved (GRI) 
        
Labour unrest         
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Lost-time injury rate         
Malaria         
Noise induced hearing loss         
New employee hires (GRI)         
Occupational health programs, 
awareness, testing and 
counselling 
        
Parental leave (GRI)         
Procurement         
Safety performance         
Stakeholder engagement         
TB         
          
ENVIRONMENTAL         
Carbon footprint         
Carbon/ fossil fuel tax         
Climate change         
Control / management of 
radioactive devices / 
radioactive nuclear gauges 
        
Environmental compliance         
Environmental Rehabilitation         
GRI GR3 guidelines, GRI 
application level 
        
Integrated resource plan         
Recycling         
Reduction in energy usage, 
renewable energy 
        
Waste/ waste management/ 
waste minimisation 
        
Water/energy consumption         
          
ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
TRANSPARENCY 
        
Accountability         
Anti-corruption         
Ethical 
standards/values/Code/good 
corporate citizen 
        
Fraud and ethics-related 
transgressions/ unethical 
behaviour/theft 
        
Integrity/ business integrity         
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Responsibility/responsible 
employer 
        
Transparency/openness         
 
 
